Israelis Reach Out to Arab Nations That Share Fear of Ascendant Iran - WSJ.com

The Wall Street Journal article referenced below ties back to several of the ideas that we have previously blogged about:

-- there is a community of interests between Israel and Sunni Arab regimes, which became apparent during the Summer War in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah. Basically, the enemy of my enemy is my friend -- Iran-led Shiite ascendancy is not good for anyone.

--Iran is as much an intermediate term threat to Sunni Arab regimes, such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Egypt, as it is an immediate treat to Israel -- and these Arab governments know it.

--the Iranians have built up their capabilities and influence in Iraq to push this battle forward for supremacy of the Arab world.

--the Palestinian issue, while perhaps not as important in the hearts and minds of Sunni Arab leadership, is very important in the Arab Street. The views onthe Arab Street have an impact on the thinking of these authoritarian regimes, which are afraid of the increasing influences in their societies of radical groups such as the Islamic Brotherhood, Al Qaeda etc...

--We in the US must do something to help bring an alliance of convenience together between the Sunni Arabs and Israel, hoping that this can be the basis for some sort of longer term relationship. We tried by giving the Israelis unprecedented support to defeat the Hezbollah Iranian proxy during the Summer, and Israel's leadership let us (and themselves) down.

--Lastly, in spite of weak international support of a sanctions program to date, if a coherent plan is not soon adopted that is realistically capable of influencing Iranian behavior with regard to the development of its nuclear war fighting capabilities, the top is going to blow off the Middle East within the next year or so, and with it, very possibly the world economy.

Secretary of State Rice is in the Middle East right now talking to the relevant parties.

What to do?

1. Start moving towards a real exit strategy from Iraq, NOW. Last night my dinner guests had a heated debate on this issue, with the sides basically falling out between,

A. "we can't withdraw or it will be a disaster for us in the Arab world, we will lose any influence we have, the Iranians will take over, and we need to have 500,000 troops there to win it", and
B. ""it's all Bush's fault (so?) and we have to get out now, forget about the consequences".

Just as Westmoreland's calls for more and more troops to Vietnam had little impact on the ultimate result of the war, I think any such attempt in Iraq will just embolden our foes, stir up greater anti-Americanism in the Arab world, hurt our "moderate" Sunni allies, kill more Americans, divide our society further on the importance of this global crusade against Islamo-fascism and have no productive lasting effect. Furthermore, "more troops" doesn't mean that we would have the political will to put them in harms way. On the other hand, we do not want to leave a terrible vacuum in Iraq.

As I have previously suggested in my blog posting of September 3rd, "Global Predictions, Part 2", we need to employ a "divide and conquer" approach in the Middle East, perhaps better phrased as "wedge politics". This means using the Sunnis to contain the growing Shiite Iranian influence, and the first place to do so is in the Iranian civil war. We have spent close to 20 years arming the Egyptian military to be the mightiest in the Arab world. The Saudis and Jordanians also have a lot to lose if the core of Iraq goes Iranian, or at least Shiite radical. We must pressure the Arab League, led by these Sunni states, to make the Iraqi problem an Arab World problem. Optimally, they would call for our withdrawal, to be supplanted by Arab League peacekeepers. This can be trumpetted as a victory of Arab nationalism, a defeat of US imperialism, and help the core Sunni regimes develop some nationalistic support for themselves in their Arab streets. It would have to be positioned, to the extent possible, as not a bailout of the US by its Arab lackeys, but as an angry statement by the Arabs that "the US interfered and screwed up, and we now have to take matters in our own hands". The discredited Bush administration has little capital left to achieve anything productive in the world, but orchestrating its own "defeat" in Iraq, followed by an Arab attempt at stabilization of that country (and establishment of a sizable Arab force on Iran's borders, by the way), could be the one thing that we can achieve (kind of like the "Mouse that Roared" in reverse). For the Arab's to take on this thankless task, we have to convince them that our abandonment of Iraq is coming soon, and that things will be a lot worse if they don't do something about it.

We can withdraw our troops to Kurdish Iraq (upon their invitation), which will serve as an added pressure point against the Iranians (and a protective measure agaisnt Turkish invasion of that region).

2. The Israeli-Palestinian Issue: While Condi pathetically moves around, with the urging of the feckless French, to try to "moderate" Syria, or alternatively try to make an onion smell like a peach by talking as if a Palestinian unity government between Hamas and Fatah could serve any useful objective, she should be spending alot more time trying to get Jordan, Israel and Abbas to talk about dusting off an old play from the playbook of the Arab-Israeli conflict that could constitute the political equivalent of a "Hail Mary" pass in football -- providing the Palestinian, Arab and Sunni world with the short term victory of a Palestinian entity under ultimate Arab control. That is, confederation of a Palestinian West Bank province under the State of Jordan, in a "trusteeship" of sorts to help it develop, over the next generation or so, its governmental institutions to the point that it can achieve independence. The West Bank would no longer be "subjugated" by the Israelis, but some modicum of dependable security for Israel would be ensured through Jordanian control (how many problems have their been on the Jordanian-Israeli border during the past 10 Years? One or two?).

Why would the Jordanians do this? Besides taking the Palestinian issue away from the radical Islamists on the Arab street in Jordan (which is 2/3rds Palestinian by population), and hence take the pressure of revolt off of the Jordanian king, it would also allow him to stem the tide of the West Bank becomig a Hamasistan onhis longest border. Now is the time to do this, while Abbas still can deliver something, before Hamas has taken over complete power.

By making some positive progress on both the Iraqi and Palestinian situations, the Sunni Arabs could strike a blow against both extremism in its own street as well as strike a blow against Iran and take some of the wind out of their sails. Iran can be expected to tep up its terrorism in Iraq and elsewhere inthe world, but if they dared hit at the Sunnis at home, they woudl sharpen the focus on a Sunni-Shiite battle, rather than an Islamic-Western one. I would much rather spend the next 10 years encouraging economic liberalization and development in the Arab world, undermining the growth of extremism while the Sunnis and Shiites duke it out, rather than spend the next ten years with the US in direct conflict with the entire Arab world.


Israelis Reach Out to Arab Nations That Share Fear of Ascendant Iran - WSJ.com