What is Really Going on with Syria -- Iran’s Strong Ties With Syria Complicate U.S. Overtures - New York Times

This article (Iran’s Strong Ties With Syria Complicate U.S. Overtures - New York Times) is a very interesting presentation of the close ties between Iran and Syria -- right down to an allusion to efforts there to convert Sunnis to Shias (this has been going on for a while, alot of it voluntarily, as middle class Syrians read the tea leaves of conversion to Shiism as a way to "get ahead" -- interesting how limited Saudi influence (or desire to influence) is in Syria, isn't it?).

Anyway, this article just begs the question of why James Baker, an otherwise intelligent and crafty international player, would do something so seemingly worthless as to advocate a serious attempt to talk with Syria. Would there really be any chance to pull them away from the Iranians or from supporting the strife in Iraq or Lebanon? Isn't he smoking something to believe this, in light of the close ties between Iran and Syria enumerated in this NY Times article? Perhaps not. I personally do not believe Baker is that naiive or stupid -- there has to be something else there, and I equally don't think it is just his historically documented disdain for Israel that would lead him to wanting to strengthen Syria's hand vis a vis Israel.

Could it be that Baker and our intelligence establishment have indications of a genuine power struggle in Syrian leadership between, on one hand, Assad and his wife, a Western leaning guy married to a former Morgan Stanley banker, and, on the other hand, Assad's military and intelligence establishment, who find their greatest material sustenance at the hands of the Iranians (which could ironically be the seeds of their own destruction, with the potential Islamization of their power structures)? Was Assad's "reach out with no pre-conditions" proposal to talk with the Israelis a genuine proposal to find a way out and forward towards the West, and preserve his power as an independent leader, or was it simply stage two (the Hizbullah-Israeli Summer War was stage one) in an elaborate plan to buy Iran time for its nuclear development and further weaken the Zionist entity politically?

Assad's father, who only Mike Wallace could eulogize in a positive way, maintained that Syria had little to offer the world to make it wealthy -- it had little oil, not much of an economy (especially after the Syrian Jewish community fled) and not the greatest geography for trade either, absent its control of Lebanon (and/or peace with Israel). Accordingly, Assad Sr. concluded that what Syria DID have to offer was politics and the "spoiler position". He used his border with Israel and Jordan as a way to extract great wealth out of the Soviets, his border with Iraq as a way to then get benefits from the West and the Saudis during and after Gulf War I and then from the Russians, French, Iraqis etc. during the "sanctions" period against Iraq, and finally, from an interesting combination of the Iranians and Sunni radicals during the post-Gulf War II phase. It is important to note throughout this history that Syria maintained its freedom of action (in Lebanon and elsewhere) by NOT becoming a reliable lapdog to any patron, and instead playing all sides to maximize its gains and flexibility to adapt to new opportunities. It loses influence over a patron by becoming "reliable". Perhaps this wile has roots geopolitically, or perhaps it stems from Assad's (and the ruling elite) Alawite minority status in Syria, and hence the need to couple flexibility with brutal repression (which has gone a bit lax under Assad Jr. -- a dangerous softness for his power base).

Assad Jr. faces the problem today of becoming increasingly cornered by the international community in Iran's camp, and in spite of the relative fecklisness of the Western response to Iran so far, he may feel it is an opportune time to cover some of Syria's Iranian bet and perhaps bring himself closer to the West; it also might not be lost on him that this might not only be a defensive move, vis a vis the Iranians, but also good for Syria's economic developent in the modern world -- remember, the Assads are secularists and a lot of Assad Jr.'s personal development is Western- based. He could have approved the Gemayel bombing several weeks ago (which would partially go against thesis that he may want to tack to the West, except as a spoiler to enhance his relevance or to molify his own elite), or it could have been perpretrated without his control by Syrian intelligence elements -- don't assume he controls the show completely like his father did, and don't assume that everything he says in public is what he means in private. I think Bernard Lewis once said something like, "In the Arab world, trust what you see some of the time, trust what you hear -- especially publicly -- none of the time". Disciplined operators of statecraft (versus wishful thinkers or fools) never forget this in dealing with Arabs.

So can you talk with Syria without empowering Iran, but rather, at its expense? Baker might think we can, or at least that it will show well for us in the Arab world....