WSJ Editorial: The Iraq Muddle Group

See below for a well thought out editorial, which among other things reinforces my recently stated view that the Study Group's idea of talking to Syria and Iran from a point of weakness -- and as if they want stability in the Middle East, no less Iraq -- could be a chimera in getting us out of there. Ditto for any linkage of "resolving" the Israel-Palestinians dispute with a solution or real progress in Iraq -- see Joe Biden elsewhere on that (he used the term "dangerously naiive").

The Iraq Muddle Group
Bush and Hakim count for more than Baker-Hamilton.

Thursday, December 7, 2006 12:01 a.m. EST

President Bush met yesterday with the Iraq Study Group to discuss its long-awaited report, but by far his most important Iraq meeting of the week was Monday's with Shiite leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. That's because the way to success in Iraq lies in stronger U.S. support for Baghdad's Shiite-led governing coalition, not in some bipartisan strategic muddle ginned up for domestic political purposes.

This is not to say that yesterday's Study Group report, led by James Baker and Lee Hamilton, serves no useful purpose. In calling for a withdrawal of most U.S. troops by 2008--if security conditions allow--the report rejects any rapid withdrawal or deadline. Likewise, it reinforces the case Mr. Bush has been making about the ugly consequences of failure in Iraq for American interests. This includes the chance of a bloodbath that would make Rwanda look tame. If the report helps to politically isolate John Murtha and the get-out-now left, its authors will have done some good.

As for specific proposals, the Study Group proves Robert Gates's point from his nomination hearing on Tuesday that "there are no new ideas on Iraq." Its best proposal--embedding more American troops to train and fight with Iraqi military units--is well under way at the Pentagon. It has been clear for some time that the Iraq Army needs at least to double its current size, and the presence of U.S. troops with Iraqi units has produced better results.

On the other hand, the ISG's proposal to negotiate with Iran and Syria is a very old idea that isn't likely to go anywhere. The report argues that because both Iran and Syria have an "interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq," they will want to cooperate in some larger regional settlement.

Come again? Iran's leadership proclaims its satisfaction with the U.S. troubles in Iraq on an almost daily basis. They seem to believe their interest lies in bleeding the U.S. so much that no President will ever contemplate regime change anywhere else for a very long time. In any case, while Iran and Syria can harm us in Iraq at the margins, Iraq's sectarian violence is primarily indigenous--fomented by Sunni Baathists and their al Qaeda allies, and countered by Shiite militias.

And this is where the ISG went most awry, with its analysis that comes close to a pox on all Iraqi factions. Of course "national reconciliation" is essential and Iraq's minority Sunnis need to be given a stake in the new Iraq. But the reality is that the main cause of the violence in Iraq--the main enemy--are the Sunni terrorists. They can't be appeased with political offers because their goal is to drive out America and then topple the government.

On that point, the best "new" idea on Iraq that we've heard runs exactly counter to the ISG suggestion of "conditional" U.S. support based on forced "reconciliation." According to a report in the Washington Post, State Department Counselor Phillip Zelikow recently drafted a memo on something called the "80% solution," referring to the roughly 80% of Iraqis who are Shiites and Kurds. Mr. Zelikow argues that U.S. attempts to draw violent Sunni factions into the political process have not only failed but also alienated our natural allies among the majority of Iraqis who welcomed the overthrow of Saddam.

This does not mean the U.S. would be taking sides with Shiite death squads against the Sunni terrorists. Far from it, the point would be to reassure Iraq's elected government that the United States is firmly on its side. This is particularly important for Mr. Hakim and other Shiites, many of whom still remember being abandoned by the U.S. after they were urged to rebel against Saddam way back in 1991.

The U.S. has resurrected that mistrust far too often since 2003--in the use of Algerian Sunni Lakhdar Brahimi to select Iraq's first interim government, and in the U.S. role earlier this year in forcing out former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari. Many Shiites now feel Nouri al-Maliki's government is being undercut too.

So it's no surprise that Maliki aides reacted angrily yesterday to the ISG suggestion of "conditional" support. Shiite mistrust also played a role in the cancellation last week of the planned three-way meeting among Mr. Maliki, Mr. Bush, and Jordan's King Abdullah. Our information is the snub had nothing to do with the leak of a memo about Mr. Maliki by National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley (the Bush-Maliki meeting went ahead as planned) but was instead a signal that the Iraqi government wants no part of a "regional solution" that involves concessions to Sunni terrorists.

A fair deal for ordinary Sunnis on oil revenues and other issues is more likely if the Shiite-led government feels secure, not threatened. The Maliki government will also have more clout to disarm Shiite militias if U.S. support seems firm. This strategy is also the best way to counter Iranian influence in Iraq. Most Iraqi Shiites have no desire to take orders from Tehran, but they will surely turn eastward if they feel abandoned by the U.S.

Mr. Bush was diplomatic in welcoming the ISG report yesterday, as he had to be. But one idea he'd do well to reject out of hand is the proposal that backing for Mr. Maliki be conditioned on U.S. benchmarks. The more the U.S. looks like it is forcing a political solution on Baghdad's moderate Shiites, the less likely a genuine "reconciliation" will become.